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Stemming from the infamous Flood v. Kuhn Supreme Court
decision in 1972, Major League Baseball's control over its labor
market benefited from a unique antitrust exemption built solely upon
a foundation of admittedly-suspect precedent.' Though Congress
subsequently demolished baseball's bizarre exemption with the Curt
Flood Act of 1998,2 every other major professional sport in America
1.
See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (holding that although Federal
Baseball and Toolson should be overruled, thus eliminating baseball's anomalous
exemption from antitrust laws, the retroactivity problems that would inevitably ensue from
such a ruling lead the court to prefer legislative action, which is prospective by nature).
2.
15 U.S.C. § 26(b) (2000). The Curt Flood Act of 1998 essentially eliminated labor
agreements from coverage under baseball's unique exemption. As a result, baseball is still
exempt in all matters other than labor. See id.
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has universally been declared by the courts to be subject to federal
3
antitrust laws.
But the story by no means ends there. While the Court in Flood
refused to consider any issues aside from baseball's unique exemption,
dissenting Justices Marshall and Brennan cited federal labor law
issues as a hurdle "lurking in the background." 4 And with the recent
unsuccessful challenge to the National Football League's eligibility
5
rule by former Ohio State sophomore running back Maurice Clarett,
it seems that federal labor law issues have moved to the forefront,
becoming an impenetrable wall which may now have effectively stifled
any impact federal antitrust laws once had over major professional
sports.
The essence of the labor law issue is that "in order to
accommodate the collective bargaining process, certain concerted
activity among and between labor and employers must be held to be
beyond the reach of the antitrust laws." 6 As such, a non-statutory
exemption has been inferred "from federal labor statutes, which set
forth a national labor policy favoring free and private collective
bargaining."7 The exemption exists, in large part, to protect from
antitrust scrutiny "some restraints on competition imposed through
the bargaining process" that would otherwise violate core antitrust
8
principles.
"The Supreme Court has never delineated the precise [contours
or] boundaries of the exemption,"9 and what little guidance it gives
comes mostly from cases in which agreements between an employer
and a labor union were alleged to have eliminated a competitor in the
employer's market (collectively referred to as the "Jewel Tea" line of
cases). 10 Since none of the major professional sports leagues have any
real "competitors" to eliminate, it has been argued that these cases
provide only limited assistance in applying the non-statutory

3.
See Michael C. Harper, Multiemployer Bargaining,Antitrust Law, and Team
Sports: The Contingent Choice of a Broad Exemption, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1663, 1663
(1997).
4.
Flood, 407 U.S. at 293-94.
5.
See generally Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
6.
See id. at 130 (citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)).
7.
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).
8.
Id. at 237.
9.
Clarett,369 F.3d at 131.
10.
See generally Int'l Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local Union No.3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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exemption to the athletic arena.1" Consequently, in the thirty-four
years since the dissenting justices in Flood identified the ubiquitous
labor law hurdle, the interaction of the antitrust laws and labor laws
in the sports world have remained "an area of law marked more by
12
controversy than by clarity."
But while controversy still looms large, the uncertain haze
surrounding the interaction between antitrust laws and labor laws is
beginning to clear up. Most recently, the 2003 Maurice Clarett saga
featured more momentum swings than Ohio State's dramatic 2002
13
Division I-A football national championship victory over Miami.
Challenging the rule that at least "three full college seasons [must]
have elapsed since [a player's] high school graduation" for a player to
be eligible to enter the NFL draft,1 4 the District Court in Clarett
initially found an antitrust violation, holding that the eligibility rule
did not fall within the scope of the non-statutory exemption.1 5 The
labor law obstacle, however, ultimately proved too large to overcome,
as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's
decision, declaring that the NFL's eligibility rule indeed fell within the
scope of the exemption despite the fact that the NFL and the player's
16
union seemingly did not bargain over the rule.
The decision in Clarett highlighted - and in some respects
created - a split among circuits in the way courts define the limits of
the non-statutory exemption. The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
follow the three factor test articulated in Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).17 In order to fall within the
non-statutory exemption under the Mackey test, the restraint must:
(1) primarily affect "only the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship," (2) concern a "mandatory subject of collective
bargaining," and (3) be a "product of bona fide arm's-length

11.
As will be discussed further below, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits all
take this position with regard to the Jewel Tea line of cases.
12.
Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
13.
Ohio State defeated Miami (Fla.) 31-24 in double-overtime of the 2003 Fiesta
Bowl to win the BCS National Championship. See Official Site of the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl,
http://www.tostitosfiestabowl.com/fiestabowlstats.html?urlID=45 (last visited Sept. 20,
2005).
14.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128-29 (citing the NFL Bylaws and quoting a memorandum
issued by the Commissioner of the NFL on February 16, 1990).
15.
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 391-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
16.
See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 142-43.
17.
See Cont'l Mar. of S.F., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d
1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir.
1979).
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bargaining."' 8 Using the Mackey test, the District Court ruled in favor
19
of Maurice Clarett.
On the other side of the coin, the Second, Third, and Seventh
Circuits have declined to follow the Mackey test in cases where the
only alleged anticompetitive effect of the challenged restraint is on a
20
labor market organized around a collective bargaining relationship.
A trio of Second Circuit decisions (collectively referred to as the
"Wood' line of cases) set forth a separate test for cases involving
players' claims that the concerted action of a professional sports
league imposed a restraint upon the labor market for players'
services. 21 In its crudest, most elementary form, this test essentially
finds exempt any restraint that pertains to a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. It is based on the general idea that "to permit
antitrust suits against sports leagues on the ground that their
concerted action imposed a restraint upon the labor market would
seriously undermine many of the policies embodied by [federal] labor
laws, including the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining
....
22 Using this rationale, the Court of Appeals ruled against
23
Maurice Clarett.
The broadly-encompassing test of the Second Circuit arguably
finds some auxiliary support from the Supreme Court decision in
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., where the Court held that the nonstatutory exemption protected the NFL's unilateral implementation of
new salary caps for developmental squad players after its collective
bargaining agreement with the players' union had expired and
negotiations over the salary cap had reached a dead end. 24 Many
observers have criticized the Brown decision for its seemingly allencompassing exemption of labor market restraints, 25 but even the
Clarett court acknowledged that the Brown decision did stop short of

18.
Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
19.
See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
20.
See U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1372 (2d Cir.
1988); Mid-America Reg'l Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist. Council, 675
F.2d 881, 893 (7th Cir. 1982); Consol. Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494,
513 (3rd Cir. 1979).
21.
See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Caldwell
v. American Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v.
Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
22.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135.
23.
See id. at 138.
24.
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
25.
See generally Spencer K. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An Analysis of
the Legality of Preventing High School Athletes and Underclassmen From Entering
ProfessionalSports Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 539 (1998).
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entirely waiving antitrust liability for labor markets characterized by
26
collective bargaining.
This note begins by reviewing the Jewel Tea line of cases that
theoretically serve as the starting point for any non-statutory
exemption discussion, followed by brief overviews of the contrasting
Wood and Mackey lines of cases. The background section then turns to
a summary of Brown - the latest Supreme Court decision relating to
the collective bargaining process in professional sports - followed by a
brief discussion of the NFL eligibility rule and how it differs from the
recently-enacted NBA eligibility rule, 27 which is of unquestioned
legality. Finally, both the District Court and Court of Appeals
decisions in Clarett are summarized.
The analysis begins with the premise that had the Clarett case
been brought in the Sixth, Eighth, or Ninth Circuits, the application of
the Mackey approach may have provided a more favorable outcome for
Mr. Clarett. Consequently, if a future college underclassman, such as
Oklahoma running back Adrian Peterson, decides to challenge the
eligibility rule in one of the aforementioned circuits, the court would
likely declare that the rule violates antitrust laws. And instead of
refusing to hear the case, as it did with Clarett, the Supreme Court's
hand would almost be forced to choose between two contradictory
decisions based on nearly-identical sets of facts.
In an attempt to provide a proposal to help guide the future
decision-makers of this issue, this note goes on to analyze which
circuit's approach does the best job of appeasing the policies behind
both antitrust law and labor law when dealing with restraints on the
labor market of professional sports leagues, and then proposes a
solution to the circuit split that takes the form of a "modified Mackey
approach."
I. BACKGROUND

A. The "ClassicFormulation"of the Exemption - The Jewel Tea Line
of Cases
Simply put, both the statutory and non-statutory labor
exemptions collectively immunize otherwise anticompetitive conduct

26.
See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (citing Brown, 518 U.S. at 235).
27.
As part of the NBA's new collective bargaining agreement, any player under the
age of 19 is not eligible for the NBA draft. See Molcom Moran, NBA Rule Creates
Uncertaintyfor Colleges, USA TODAY, Jul. 18, 2005, at Cll.
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from antitrust scrutiny.2 8 The statutory exemptions, which can be
found in both the Clayton Act 29 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 30 do
not cover the issues present in the NFL eligibility rule. However, the
non-statutory exemption, a construct of the courts, has been "implied.
. . from federal labor statutes, which set forth a national labor policy
favoring free and private collective bargaining, which require good
faith bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions . . . ."31 If
any rule or agreement is found to be immune from antitrust scrutiny
based on this non-statutory labor exemption, it provides a complete
32
defense for its legality.
The Supreme Court first dealt with the non-statutory
exemption in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Allen), where the New York City
electrical workers union negotiated a series of agreements in which
local manufacturers agreed to deal only with fellow manufacturers
that employed the union's members. 33 A non-local manufacturer that
was excluded from the market sued under antitrust laws, and
although the Court recognized that the restraints were sought out of
"a desire to get and hold jobs for [union members] at good wages and
under high working standards,"'34 -

essentially two of the three

aforementioned pillars of labor law - it held that the non-statutory
exemption did not apply where unions combined with employers and
35
manufacturers of goods to restrain competition in such goods.
Two decades after the Allen decision, the Supreme Court dealt
with the non-statutory exemption twice in the same year. In United
Mine Workers v. Pennington (Pennington), a miners union agreed with
large coal mining companies that the union would demand higher
wages from small coal mining companies in an attempt to drive the
smaller companies out of business. 36 In holding that the non-statutory
exemption again did not apply, the Court stated that while "a union
may make wage agreements with a multi-employer bargaining unit
and may .

.

. seek to obtain the same terms from other employers," it

28.
See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 390-91 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
29.
See Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
30.
See Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
31.
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).
32.
See Clarett,306 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
33.
325 U.S. 797, 799-800 (1945).
34.
Id. at 798.
35.
Id. at 809.
36.
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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cannot "agree[ I with one set of37employers to impose a certain wage
scale on other bargaining units."
Later that year, the Court delivered its most lucid
interpretation of the non-statutory exemption in Local No. 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co.
(Jewel Tea), which involved a collective bargaining agreement
between the butchers union and the meat sellers in Chicago whereby
the meat sellers agreed to limit the hours of operation of meat
counters.3 8 Jewel Tea, a meat seller that signed the agreement under
pressure from the union, challenged the agreement on antitrust
grounds, but it notably did not allege that the hours restriction
eliminated competition amongst meat sellers.3 9 The Court held that
the restriction did fall within the non-statutory exemption, but the
reason for applying the exemption was the subject of intense
40
disagreement.
Justice White, writing for himself and two other Justices,
believed the application of the exemption should be determined by
balancing "the interests of union members" served by the restraint
against "its relative impact on the product market."4 1 Applying this
test, the Justices found the hours restriction was "so intimately
related to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions'
successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide, arm'slength bargaining in pursuit of their own labor policies, and not at the
behest of or in competition with nonlabor groups, falls within [the
exemption] ."42 This test is widely regarded as the "classic formulation"
43
of the non-statutory exemption.
Concurring in Jewel Tea (but dissenting in Pennington),
Justice Goldberg and two other Justices found that "no such balancing
was necessary". 44 Adopting the most ardent support of labor law to
date, the Justices found that all "collective bargaining activity
concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the [labor laws] is
45
not subject to antitrust laws."

37.

Id. at 665.

38.

381 U.S. 676, 679-80 (1965).

39.
40.

See id. at 688.
See id.

41.

Id. at 690 n.5.

42.

Id. at 689-90.

43.
See Local 210, Laborers' Int'l Union v. Labor Relations Div. Associated Gen.
Contractors, 844 F.2d 69, 79 (2d Cir. 1988).
44.
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2004) (referring to
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 712).
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 710 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
45.
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B. The Beginnings of the Circuit Split - Mackey vs. Wood
The first court to (attempt to) define the boundaries of the nonstatutory exemption in the context of professional sports was the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, when in 1976, legendary tight end,
John Mackey 46 , led a pack of professional football players challenging
an NFL rule which essentially required teams to compensate any
team from which they hired away a player whose contract had
expired. 47 Known as the "Rozelle Rule," 48 the players argued that this

requirement constituted an unlawful conspiracy amongst the NFL
teams to restrict players' abilities to freely contract for their services. 49
In its defense, the NFL argued the Rozelle Rule was exempt from
antitrust law by virtue of its inclusion in the collective bargaining
50
agreement.
51
Deducing "certain principles" from the Jewel Tea line of cases,
the Mackey court held that in order to fall within the non-statutory
exemption, a restraint must: (1) primarily affect only the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship, (2) concern a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining relationship, and (3) be a product of bona fide
arm's-length bargaining. 52 While the court found the first two prongs
to be satisfied, it ruled that the exemption did not apply because the
Rozelle Rule was not the product of arm's-length negotiation. 53 Of
particular importance was the fact that the Rozelle Rule predated the
making of the collective bargaining agreement, and the record lacked
sufficient evidence that the players union had received some quid pro
54
quo in exchange for including the rule in the agreement.
With the Mackey test on the books, the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits quickly followed suit in McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,55
and ContinentalMaritime of San Francisco,Inc. v. Pacific Coast Metal

46.
In his 10 year NFL career, John Mackey made the Pro Bowl five times en route
to being enshrined in the Pro Football Hall of Fame. See Pro Football Hall of Fame,
http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/member.jsp?playerjid=138 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
47.
See generally Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
48.
The "Rozelle Rule" was named after then-NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle. See
id. at 609.
49.
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609.
50.
See id.
51.
In particular, the Mackey approach was "gleaned" from Justice White's majority
opinion in Jewel Tea. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
52.
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
53.
Id. at 615-16.
54.
Id. at 616.
55.
600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
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Trades District Council.56 However, the Second Circuit, along with the
Third and Seventh Circuits, did not acquiesce.
Whereas the Second Circuit has adopted the Jewel Tea
reasoning for cases involving union agreements that disadvantage
their competitors, it has not addressed the Jewel Tea - and by
implication the Mackey - reasoning for cases involving restraints upon
the labor market characterized by a collective bargaining
relationship.5 7 Instead, as is outlined below, the Second Circuit
essentially adopts Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Jewel Tea
that all "collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects
of bargaining under the labor laws is not subject to the antitrust
58
laws."
In Wood, a recently-drafted player challenged the NBA's
policies regarding the entry draft process and team salary caps
alleging that the agreements among horizontal competitors served to
eliminate competition for college players. 59 The court held that "in
light of the unusual economic imperatives of professional basketball,"
the non-statutory exemption applied to the policies "particularly
because Wood challenged agreements concerning mandatory subjects
of bargaining." 60 Moreover, the court reasoned that to allow Wood to
"cherry-pick" particular policies that were simply small parts of
"unique bundle[s] of compromises" would run counter to the freedom
to contract that labor law intends unions and employers to have
during collective bargaining. 61 Important to note in this case was the
fact that all of the challenged policies were included in the collective
bargaining agreement and memorandum of understanding between
62
the NBA and its players.
Eight years after the Wood decision, the Second Circuit dealt
with another antitrust suit in National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams,
only this time the challenged restraints were not encompassed in any
collective bargaining agreement because the agreement had expired
after negotiations had reached an impasse. 63 Despite the fact that the
rules were implemented unilaterally by the NBA, the court

56.
57.

817 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986).
See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.

denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).

Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
58.
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 710 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 956-58 (2d Cir. 1987).
59.
60.
Clarett,369 F.3d. at 136.
Wood, 809 F.2d at 961.
61.
See id. at 957-58.
62.
45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995).
63.
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nonetheless applied the non-statutory exemption, explaining that
"multi-employer bargaining units are a long-accepted
and
of
advantages
tactical
the
employers
giving
of
means
commonplace
"[imperil] the
collective action," and to allow the challenge would
''64
legitimacy of the multi-employer bargaining unit.
C. Brown v. Pro Football
With facts similar to Williams, the Supreme Court in 1996
finally heard a case involving a challenged restraint upon the market
for players' services. In Brown, the NFL unilaterally implemented a
rule capping the weekly salaries of developmental squad players after
negotiations with the players union over such a proposal became
deadlocked. 65 The Court held that employers could agree to take
actions to impose controls on a labor market, if those actions: "grew
out of' and were "directly related to" a multi-employer bargaining
process; did not offend the federal labor laws that sanction and
regulate the process; affected terms of employment subject to
compulsory bargaining; and concerned only parties to the collective
66
bargaining relationship.
In finding that the non-statutory exemption did apply, the
Court made numerous other important comments. First, it held that
the exemption was not so narrow as to protect only understandings
embodied in an existing collective bargaining agreement, "for the
collective-bargaining process may take place before the making of any
agreement or after an agreement has expired." 67 Second, the Court
refused the players' contention that the labor of professional sports
players was unique and that the market for players' services therefore
should be treated differently than other organized labor markets for
68
purposes of the exemption.
Finally, the Court refused to endorse the broad ruling from the
lower courts that "waiv[ed] antitrust liability for restraints on
competition imposed through the collective-bargaining process, so long
as such restraints operate primarily in a labor market characterized
69
by collective bargaining."

64.
65.

Clarett, 369 F.3d at 136.
See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 234-35 (1996).

See id. at 250. See generally Harper, supra note 3 (providing an in-depth critique
66.
of Brown).

67.
68.
69.

Brown, 518 U.S. at 243.
See id. at 248-49.
Id. at 234.
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D. NFL Eligibility Rule
The current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between
the NFL and its players union became effective in 1993 and governs
through 2007.70 Despite its scrupulous treatment of the manner in
which teams select players in the draft, as well as the compensation
scheme by which rookies are paid, there is no mention of the eligibility
rule in the CBA itself. 71 Contrast this with the new NBA eligibility
rule, which is explicitly included within the four corners of its
72
collective bargaining agreement.
At the time the CBA became effective, the eligibility rule was
included in Article XII of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, which
were last amended in 1992, though the original version of the
73
eligibility rule was first adopted shortly after the 1925 draft.
According to the CBA, the players' union agreed to "waive . . . its
rights to bargain over any provision of the Constitution and Bylaws..
"74

In its form today, the rule states that at least "three full college
seasons must have elapsed since [a player's] high school graduation"
75
for him to be eligible to enter the draft.
E. Clarett: Touchdown Overruled Upon FurtherReview
The modern version of the NFL eligibility rule was challenged
for the first time by Maurice Clarett, a controversial running back
coming off a sophomore season where he was found to be ineligible to
play college football for violating various NCAA and school rules. 76
Aside from the millions likely awaiting him in the NFL, there was also
a strong possibility that, had Clarett returned to Ohio State for his
junior year, he would be ineligible for at least a handful of games to
begin the season.7 7 With these factors in mind, Clarett, an Ohio
70.
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (referring to
the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (1993)), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
71.
Id.
72.
See generally NAT'L BASKETBALL LEAGUE, NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT (2005), available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba-articles.php(last visited Sept.
20, 2005).
73.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 127; see Rosner, supra note 25, at 542.
74.
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(quoting the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement).
75.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128-29 (citing the NFL Bylaws and quoting a memorandum
issued by the Commissioner of the NFL on February 16, 1990).
76.
See Mike Freeman, Buckeyes Suspend Clarett For Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2003, at D1.
77.
See id.
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resident, filed an antitrust suit in the Southern District of New York
in January of 2004.78
The court initially embarked on a lengthy discussion of the
non-statutory exemption, stating unequivocally that "the Second
Circuit has not adopted a test that controls the [exemption's]
application." 79 However, after articulating the Mackey test, the court
stated that "in more recent cases, the Second Circuit acknowledged
the [Mackey test], but preferred to apply the simple formulation
enunciated by the Supreme Court in [Jewel Tea]."80 And despite the
Wood line of cases expressly rejecting Jewel Tea's "simple formulation"
in cases where the anti-competitive restraint is being placed on
competitors to the labor market organized around the collective
bargaining relationship, 8 ' the court distinguished the Wood line by
finding that instead of involving job eligibility, "the league provisions
in [those cases] govern[ed] the terms by which those who are drafted
are employed."8 2 Accordingly, when it applied the NFL eligibility rule
to the exemption, the court analyzed the rule within the framework of
the three Mackey requirements instead of the Wood analysis as
83
adopted by the Second Circuit.
The court first opined that "the rule does not address a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining."8 4 The mandatory subjects
deal only with wages, hours, or conditions of employment, and
according to the court, nothing in the rule references those three
subjects.8 5 Furthermore, the rule "makes a class of potential players
unemployable."8 6 "Wages, hours or working conditions affect only
87
those who are employed or eligible for employment."
The court next stated that "the exemption is also inapplicable
because the Rule only affects players, like Clarett, who are complete
strangers to the bargaining relationship."8 8 While the court

78.

See generally Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
79.
Id. at 391.
80.
Id. at 392; see Local 210, Laborers' Int'l Union. v. Labor Relations Div.
Associated Gen. Contractors, 844 F.2d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that "although we
believe that the agreement in the instant case could satisfy [the Mackey] test, we need not
adopt this particular analysis. Rather, we rely on. . . Jewel Tea.").
81.
See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
82.
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (additional emphasis added).
83.
See id. at 393-97.
84.
See id. at 393 (capitalization altered).
85.
See id.

86.
87.

Id.
Id.

88.

Id. at 395.
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acknowledged the exemption's applicability to both current and
prospective employees, it found Clarett's situation different because
the rule made him unemployable, and thus not a "prospective
employee."8 9 According to the court:
Employees who are hired after the collective bargaining agreement is negotiated
are nonetheless bound by its terms because they step into the shoes of the players
who did engage in collective bargaining. But those who are categorically denied
eligibility for employment, even90 temporarily, cannot be bound by the terms of
employment they cannot obtain.

Finally, the court held that the exemption also does not apply
because "the NFL ... failed to demonstrate that the rule evolved from
arm's-length negotiations." 91 From the "meager facts" presented, the
court found "that the first version of the rule could not have arisen
from the collective bargaining process," and "the NFL offer[ed] no
evidence that the Rule was addressed during the collective bargaining
'
negotiations prior to 1993. 92
But before the end zone celebration from Clarett's in-court
victory could be finished, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
announced its decision in favor of the NFL just days before the
93
scheduled NFL draft.
After summing up the District Court's decision, the court
reiterated its stance from Wood that it has "never regarded the
[Mackey] test as defining the appropriate limits of the non-statutory
exemption." 94 Therefore, instead of applying the eligibility rule to the
three Mackey requirements, the court framed the issue in terms of
"whether subjecting the NFL's eligibility rules to antitrust scrutiny
would 'subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor policy.' 95
In answering that inquiry, the court determined that "to regard
the NFL's eligibility rules as merely permissive bargaining subjects
would 'ignore the reality of collective bargaining in sports.' ",96 First,
due to the "unusual economic imperatives of professional sports," the

89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 395-96.
91.
Id. at 396.
92.
Id.
93.
NFL Draft was held on April 24 -25, 2004 in New York City. The Clarett case
was argued on April 19, 2004. After arguments the Court announced its decision in favor
of the NFL, however, the opinion was not published until May 24, 2004. See Clarett v.
Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
94.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133.
95.
Id. at 138 (quoting Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir.
1987)).
96.
Id. at 140 (quoting Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm.,
Inc., 67 F.3d 1054, 1061-62 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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rule constitutes a "mandatory bargaining subject because [it has]
tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL
players. '9 7 Second, the court found that the rule "[represents] a quite
literal condition for initial employment and for that reason alone
might constitute a mandatory bargaining subject."9 8 Aside from the
complex issues of free agency, team salary caps, and league-wide
salary pools for rookies, the court also believed that the rule affected
job security of veteran players by reducing competition in the market
for entering players. 99
The court continued to address the mandatory subject inquiry
when it countered Clarett's claim that the exemption does not apply
because the rule affects players outside of the union, declaring that
"simply because the eligibility rules work a hardship on prospective
rather
than
current
employees
does
not
render
them
impermissible." 100 In support of this assertion, the court compared the
eligibility rule to hiring hall arrangements, where the criteria for
employment are set by the rules of the hiring hall rather than the
employer alone, and where such arrangements have still been found to
be mandatory subjects of bargaining despite the fact that they concern
prospective rather than current employees. 10 1
In dicta, the court then further opined that the absence of any
evidence
of arm's-length
bargaining
over the rule
was
inconsequential. 10 2 The eligibility rule, along with many other NFL
rules and policies included in the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws, was
well known to the union, and "given that the eligibility rules are a
mandatory bargaining subject . . .the union or the NFL could have

forced the other to the bargaining table if either felt that a change was
warranted." 10 3 Furthermore, the court believed that since the union
waived "any challenge to the Constitution and Bylaws and thereby
acquiesced in the continuing operation of the eligibility rules."1 0 4
In short, while the Second Circuit refused to apply the Mackey
test, it nevertheless addressed and rebutted each of the three Mackey
requirements analyzed by the District Court. And when the Supreme

97.
98.
1995)).
99.

100.
101.
N.L.R.B.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 140.
Id. at 129 (citing Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 529 (2d Cir.
Id. at 140.

Id. (citing Wood, 809 F.2d at 960).
Id. at 140-41 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors,
409, 412, enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965)).
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id.

Houston Chapter,

143
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Court refused to grant certiorari for Clarett just days before the NFL
draft, the eligibility rule remained fully intact ... at least for the time
being.

II. ANALYSIS
A. The CriticalDecision to Bring the Suit in the Second Circuit
When the Second Circuit rejected the Mackey approach in
Clarett, it joined the Third and Seventh Circuits in their method 10of5
"defining the appropriate limits of the non-statutory exemption."
With the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all having already adopted
the Mackey approach, 10 6 three circuits now reside on each side of the
recently well-defined circuit split.
Hindsight being the national pastime that it is, lawyers for
Maurice Clarett undoubtedly rue the day they brought the action in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Knowing their ultimate fate would be decided by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, who previously recognized in Wood that Mackey is
"of limited assistance in determining whether an athlete can challenge
restraints on the market for professional sports players imposed
through a collective bargaining process," 10 7 one must wonder why the
suit was not brought in a district court residing in the Sixth, Eighth or
Ninth Circuits, where the Courts of Appeals all follow the morestringent Mackey approach. The decision is particularly suspicious
when considering the fact that Clarett resided and played football in
the state of Ohio, which is a Sixth Circuit state.
According to the CBA, nothing prohibits a suit against the NFL
from being brought outside the state of New York.10 8 The only
partially relevant provision, Article LIX entitled "Governing Law,"
states that "to the extent that federal law does not govern the
implementation of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be construed
and interpreted under, and shall be governed by, the laws applicable

105. Id. at 133.
106. See Cont'l Mar. of S.F., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d
1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir.
1979); Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
107. Clarett,369 F.3d at 134.
108. See generally NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (1993), availableat http://www.nflpa.org/members/
main.asp?subpage=CBA+Complete#art56.
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to contracts made and performed in the State of New York."'10 9 This
provision only pertains to the choice of law principles that will govern
a suit brought in the United States; it does not preclude any lawsuit
fulfilling the requirements of both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction from being brought in a federal district court outside of
New York.
Without a provision in the CBA restricting the choice of venue,
the question remains: Could Clarett's lawyers have brought in suit in
the Sixth, Eighth or Ninth Circuits, just as John Mackey's lawyers did
in 1976? In short: yes.
The subject matter jurisdiction over an antitrust challenge in
federal court is easily satisfied, as such actions undoubtedly fall
exclusively within the ambit of federal law (thus making the
aforementioned Article LIX irrelevant to the cases at hand). Moreover,
courts have unanimously declared that "the doctrine of exclusive
primary National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction has never been
applied by the Supreme Court to avoid a determination on the merits
of an antitrust claim. 11 0
Similarly, personal jurisdiction over the NFL is also easily
satisfied. The NFL is an unincorporated association consisting of
thirty-two professional football teams which are located in each of the
eleven U.S. Circuits. 1 The NFL has minimum contacts sufficient to
satisfy personal jurisdiction with every state or circuit in which it
conducts business. "The business of professional football . . . involves a
variety of activities, including the playing of football games,
transporting players and other team personnel, employing players and
other personnel, purchasing and transporting equipment, and
arranging telecasts and broadcasts of professional football games
through contracts with television and radio networks or stations."'1 2

109.

Id. art. LIX.

110. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1001 (D.C. Minn. 1975)
(referencing the Sherman Antitrust Act and National Labor Relations Act), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).

111. First Circuit (New England Patriots), Second Circuit (New York Jets, Buffalo
Bills), Third Circuit (New York Giants, Pittsburgh Steelers, Philadelphia Eagles), Fourth
Circuit (Baltimore Ravens, Carolina Panthers, Washington Redskins), Fifth Circuit (New
Orleans Saints, Dallas Cowboys, Houston Texans), Sixth Circuit (Tennessee Titans, Detroit
Lions, Cleveland Browns, Cincinnati Bengals), Seventh Circuit (Green Bay Packers,
Indianapolis Colts, Chicago Bears), Eighth Circuit (St. Louis Rams, Kansas City Chiefs,
Minnesota Vikings), Ninth Circuit (Arizona Cardinals, San Diego Chargers, Oakland
Raiders, San Francisco 49ers, Seattle Seahawks), Tenth Circuit (Denver Broncos),
Eleventh Circuit (Atlanta Falcons, Jacksonville Jaguars, Miami Dolphins, Tampa Bay
Buccaneers). Note that the D.C. Circuit is the only U.S. Circuit without an NFL team
located in its jurisdiction.
112.

Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1002.
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As such, since it conducts business in states within all twelve circuits
(including the District of Columbia), courts in every circuit will have
personal jurisdiction over the NFL.
B. Peterson v. NationalFootball League - Under the Mackey Approach
In 2004, for the first time in the seventy year history of the
Heisman Trophy - which is awarded annually to the most outstanding
college football player in the country - two of the five finalists were
either freshmen or sophomores. 113 Adrian Peterson, then a freshman
at the University of Oklahoma, actually made college football history
by finishing second in the voting. 11 4 It is not difficult to see why
professional scouts are licking their chops for the chance to draft the
6-foot, 2-inch, 210 pound running back who tallied 1,925 rushing
yards in his debut season 15 . And it's not difficult to see how this
nineteen-year-old, who has been living without his biological parents
since elementary school, may not want to delay the million dollar
security of the NFL for two more years, which he is required to do
under the current NFL eligibility rules.
It is almost inevitable that some time in the near future, an
athlete like Peterson, who by all accounts would have been a top five
pick if the 2005 NFL draft, will decide to challenge the NFL's
eligibility rules after his freshman or sophomore season. Surely
Peterson would not bring the suit in the Second Circuit, for he would
be stopped cold by a recently-overturned District Court. However, if
Peterson were to bring the suit in the any of the circuits that have
firmly adopted the Mackey approach, it is possible that he may find a
crack in one of the three Mackey requirements and bust through the
non-statutory exemption protecting the NFL's eligibility barrier.
As stated previously, in order to fall within the non-statutory
exemption under the Mackey test, the restraint must: (1) "primarily
affectH only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship," (2)
"concernf a mandatory subject of collective bargaining," and (3) be a
"product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining."1' 16 The District Court
113. See Heisman.com, http://www.heisman.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/
121104aaa.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
114. Id.
115. See Yahoo! Sports, NCAA Football, http://sports.yahoo.comlncaaf/stats/
bycategory?cat=rushing&sort=10&conference=I-Aall&year=2004 (last visited Sept. 20,
2005). To put this in perspective, Clarett rushed for 1,237 yards in his first and only
collegiate season. See DenverBroncos.com, http://www.denverbroncos.coml
page.php?id=498&contentID=4342 (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
116. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (emphasis
added).
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in Clarett found that the NFL eligibility rule violated all three of the
requirements, but even though the Court of Appeals declined to follow
the Mackey test, it still presented compelling arguments that the NFL
did satisfy each of the three requirements. 117 Consequently, the
application of the Mackey test would not automatically result in a
landmark decision against the NFL, but it certainly does open up
more avenues for players like Peterson.
1. Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining
Peterson would first argue that the NFL's eligibility rule does
not constitute a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), parties in collective bargaining
have an obligation to "confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and... conditions of employment.. .... 118 Therefore, if a subject
of collective bargaining does not somehow pertain to "wages, hours,
and conditions of employment," then it will be characterized as
permissive instead of mandatory.
The rule at issue states that at least "three full college seasons
must have elapsed since [a player's] high school graduation" for them
to be eligible to enter the draft.1 1 9 On the surface, there is no reference
to wages (e.g., the salary cap for rookies in Wood and Williams), hours
(e.g., limits on the length of rookie training camps) or conditions of
employment (e.g., availability of proper medical personnel during
games).
However, two arguments can be set forth supporting the
proposition that the eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. First, the NFL could argue - echoing the Court of Appeals
in Clarett - that the rule is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining because it has a tangible effect on the wages and working
conditions of current NFL players. 120 Using a loose interpretation of
"tangible effect" tailored to the "special arrangements in professional
sports," the Clarett court stated that the "complex scheme by which
individual salaries in the NFL are set, which involves, inter alia, the
NFL draft, league-wide salary pools, and free agency, was built
around the long-standing restraint on the market for entering players

117. See generally Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (West Supp. 2005).
119. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128-29 (citing the NFL Bylaws and quoting a memorandum
issued by the Commissioner of the NFL on February 16, 1990).
120. See id. at 140.
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imposed by the eligibility rule." 121 The Second Circuit found its
support in a case where it held that free agency and baseball's reserve
system were mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. 122 However,
no such case law exists in the Sixth, Eighth, or Ninth Circuits, and
even if it did, the NFL's eligibility rule is quite different than
baseball's free agency and reserve system. For one thing, since there
are a fixed number of draft picks and rookie positions available, it is
hard to see how the eligibility rule can affect the rookie salary cap.
The same number of players, and in theory the same caliber of
players, will be selected regardless of who is eligible to be selected.
The NFL may argue that by reducing competition in the
market for entering players, the eligibility rule also affects the job
security of veteran players. The counter to this argument is that most
NFL teams have a limited number of roster spots available for rookie
players, and the fact that the competition for those spots increases
without the eligibility rule has no effect on the job security of veteran
players. Put another way, the fact that younger rookies may take
roster spots which would otherwise be occupied by older rookies has
virtually no impact on the job security of veteran players.
Additionally, unlike the National Basketball Association, where
rosters consist of only twelve players, NFL rosters consist of sixty
players, so the addition of a handful of younger rookies in place of a
handful of older rookies has even less of an impact than it would in a
sport like professional basketball.
The second (and more persuasive) argument is that "the
eligibility rules for the draft represent a quite literal condition for
initial employment and for that reason alone might constitute a
mandatory bargaining subject." 123 On the surface, this argument
seems to mistake conditions of employment with conditions for
employment. Conditions of employment are defined as "personnel
policies, practices, and matters . . .affecting working conditions."'' 24
The term "working conditions" ordinarily calls to mind the day-to-day
circumstances under which an employee performs his or her job. 125

121. Id.
122. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 67 F.3d
1054, 1061 (2d Cir. 1995).
123. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139 (citing Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523,
529 (2d Cir. 1995)).
124. Dep't of Def. Dependents Sch. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 863 F.2d 988, 990
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14)).
125. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 221-22 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (although "the phrase 'conditions of employment' is no doubt
susceptible of diverse interpretations . . . in common parlance, the conditions of a person's
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The Supreme Court, however, in 1958 held that, in the context
of deciding whether a subject of bargaining is a mandatory,
'employment' connotes the initial act of employing as well as the
consequent state of being employed."'126 In fact, the National Labor
Relations Board has specifically held that the collective bargaining
process does include the obtaining of employment, and is not limited
only to those conditions which arise after an actual employment
relationship has been established. 127 As a result, a court in the Sixth,
Eighth, or Ninth Circuits would likely find the rule to be a permissive
- not a mandatory - subject of the collective bargaining process.
2. Parties to the Collective Bargaining Relationship
With the mandatory bargaining subject avenue likely closed,
Peterson would next argue that the non-statutory labor exemption is
inapplicable because the eligibility rule only affects players who are
complete strangers to the bargaining relationship. Whereas wages,
hours, and working conditions affect only those who are employed or
eligible for employment, Peterson would argue that the eligibility rule
makes a class of potential players simply unemployable. 128 This
argument is closely linked to whether the rule is or is not a mandatory
subject, as the District Court in Clarett made clear when it stated,
"[t]hat the non-statutory exemption does not apply in such a case is
simply the flip side of the rule that the exemption only applies to
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, those governing wages,
129
hours, and working conditions."'
However, since the District Court was likely incorrect in its
assessment that the eligibility rule was a not mandatory subject, it
follows that the District Court was also incorrect in its assessment
that the rule affects parties outside the collective bargaining process.
Just as the Supreme Court found that "employment" connotes the
initial act of employing as well as the consequent state of being
employed, the National Labor Relations Board has interpreted the
Supreme Court's 1958 ruling as including within the definition of
"employees" those individuals already working for the employer as
employment are most obviously the various physical dimensions
environment").
126. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, 143 N.L.R.B.
(citing Williams v. Borg & Warner Auto. Elecs. and Mech. Sys. Corp., 520
(emphasis added)).
127. See id.
128. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393
rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
129. Id. at 395.

of his

working

409, 412 (1963)
U.S. 1153 (1997)

(S.D.N.Y. 2004),
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well as prospective employees.1 30 As a result, the Court of Appeals in
Clarett was correct in saying that "simply because the eligibility rules
work a hardship on prospective rather than current employees does
not render them impermissible."'1 31 Accordingly, a court in the Sixth,
Eighth, or Ninth Circuits would likely find that prospective players do
fit within the definition of parties to the collective bargaining
relationship.
3. Product of Bona Fide Arms-Length Negotiation
With the first two Mackey requirements likely satisfied by the
NFL, Peterson would finally argue that the NFL cannot show that the
eligibility rule arose from bona fide, arm's-length negotiation. The
original version of the eligibility rule was adopted shortly after 1925,
but the first collective bargaining agreement was not adopted until
1968.132 Thus, the original version of the eligibility rule seemingly did
not arise from the collective bargaining. Moreover, the NFL likely
cannot offer any compelling evidence that the eligibility rule was
addressed during collective bargaining negotiations leading up to the
current agreement in 1993,133 which contains no mention of the rule.
It is this crucial distinction that highlights the difference
between the NBA eligibility rule, which stands on firmly entrenched
legal ground, and the NFL eligibility rule, which wobbles on
precariously shaky legal ground. Perhaps learning from the NFL's
mistake, the NBA specifically included its eligibility rule in its CBA,
thereby providing unequivocal evidence that the rule was indeed a
product of bona fide negotiation1 34.
The absence of the NFL rule in its CBA, however, does not
necessarily preclude the application of the non-statutory exemption
since the Supreme Court in Brown held that the exemption was not so
narrow as to protect only agreements between parties that are
embodied in an existing collective bargaining agreement.1 35 While not
mentioned in the collective bargaining agreement, the eligibility rule
can be found in the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws, which the players'
association "waive[d] ... its rights to bargain over any provision of the

130.
131.
125 S. Ct.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Houston Chapter, 143 N.L.R.B. at 412.
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
1728 (2005).
Clarett,306 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
See id. (referencing the Declaration of Peter Ruocco 1 8).
See generally supra note 72.
See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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Constitution and Bylaws."1 36 The NFL would maintain that since the
players' association agreed to waive any challenge to the Constitution,
and thereby acquiesced to the continuing operation of the eligibility
rule contained therein, it was "bargained for." However, the players'
association actually waived its right to bargain over any provision in
the Constitution, which suggests that the eligibility rule contained
therein clearly was never the subject of bargaining.
Countering this argument, the Second Circuit in Clarett found
that it was entirely possible that the players' association might not
have regarded the difference in opinions over the eligibility rule as
sufficient to warrant the expenditure of precious time at the
bargaining table in light of other important issues. 137 The court went
on to hold that "[i]t would disregard those policies [favoring the
collective bargaining process] to hold that some 'particular quid pro
quo must be proven to avoid antitrust liability.' "138
But while this argument held up in the Second Circuit, it is
entirely inconsistent with established precedent in the Sixth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits. In Mackey, the court refused to apply the nonstatutory exemption based largely on the fact that the record lacked
sufficient evidence to conclude that the players union had received
some quid pro quo in exchange for including the rule at issue in the
collective bargaining agreement.139 Since the NFL will be arguing that
the non-statutory exemption should apply, it is the NFL's burden to
establish each of the three Mackey factors. Therefore, according to
Mackey, it is the NFL's burden to present sufficient evidence to
conclude that the players' association received some quid pro quo in
exchange for the inclusion of the eligibility rule. The NFL has no such
evidence, 140 which leads to the conclusion that the Mackey test would
likely defeat the NFL's defense that the non-statutory exemption
protects it from antitrust liability.

136.

Clarett,306 F. Supp. 2d at 396.

137.
138.

Clarett,369 F.3d at 142.
Id. at 143 (citing Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 962 (2d Cir.

1987)).
139. See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976).
140. The only evidence presented to the court in Clarett was a vague and conclusory
declaration from an NFL employee stating: "During the course of collective bargaining that
led to the 1993 CBA, the eligibility rule itself was the subject of collective bargaining." This
declaration is unsubstantiated by any documents or supporting declarations. Clarett, 369
F.3d at 128.
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C. Mackey Test vs. Clarett Test - Discussingthe Merits of Both
Approaches
With the possibility of a contrary holding in the Peterson
hypothetical, it is likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari
to settle the circuit split created by Clarett; thus finally resolving the
labor law issues that, according to Justice Marshall in Flood, "[move]
in and out of the shadows like an uninvited guest at a party whom one
14 1
can't decide either to embrace or expel."
Very plainly, the purpose behind the non-statutory exemption
is to favor labor law over antitrust law by permitting collective
bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions. 142 Though
whichever test eventually adopted should give the policies inherent in
labor law the most weight, the test must strike an effective balance of
"the conflicting policies embodied in the labor and antitrust laws. 14n3
The Mackey approach is essentially based on the belief that the
Jewel Tea line of cases dictates the appropriate boundaries of the nonstatutory exemption for cases in which the only alleged anticompetitive effect is on the labor market organized in the collective
bargaining relationship. 44 The Second Circuit, which expressly
rejected this view in Wood and Clarett, has held that the Jewel Tea
line of cases should only apply when the anti-competitive restraint is
being placed on competitors to the labor market organized around the
1 45
collective bargaining relationship.
While both the Mackey approach and the Clarett approach
acknowledge that the non-statutory exemption was designed to shield
from antitrust scrutiny conduct that is mandated under the labor laws
(mandatory bargaining subjects),1 46 the Mackey approach goes two
steps further by requiring that the restraint primarily affect only the
parties to the collective bargaining relationship and be a product of
bona fide, arm's-length bargaining. But with the Supreme Court's
expansive view of "employees" as covering prospective as well as
current employees, 47 the only material difference is the requirement
of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.
141.
142.

Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 295 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.

616, 621-22 (1975).

143. Local 210, Laborers' Int'l Union v. Labor Relations Div. Associated Gen.
Contractors, 844 F.2d 69, 79 (2d Cir. 1987).
144. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134.
145. See id.
146. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
147. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, 143 N.L.R.B. 409, 412 (1963).
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According to the Clarett court, the over-arching issue it had to
decide was "whether subjecting the NFL's eligibility rules to antitrust
scrutiny would 'subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor
policies.' ",148 As mentioned above, those fundamental principles
"[favor] free and private collective bargaining . . . which require [s]
good-faith bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions ...
"149 Accordingly, it seems clear that the extra Mackey requirement of
bona fide arm's-length bargaining furthers - rather than subverts the goal of "free," "private," and "good faith" bargaining. For this
reason, even, though the added requirement of arm's-length
bargaining places an extra limitation on the applicability of the nonstatutory exemption, the Mackey approach is actually more in line
with labor law ideals than the Clarett approach . . . and thus the
Mackey approach more effectively strikes a balance between labor law
and antitrust law.
As a general matter, the differences in Mackey and Clarett can
be summed up by looking at the differences in Justice White's
majority opinion and Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Jewel
50

Tea. 1

Support for the arm's-length negotiation requirement can be
found in the binding language of Justice White in Jewel Tea. In
finding that the provision in question was intimately related to wages,
hours and working conditions, Justice White made special note of the
fact that the provision was obtained through arms-length bargaining,
and thus fell within the non-statutory exemption. Even though the
facts and circumstances in Jewel Tea differ from the eligibility rule,
such arm's-length negotiation still furthers labor law goals whether
the restraint is being placed on the labor market itself (as is the case
with the eligibility rule) or the competitors to the labor market (as is
the case in Jewel Tea).
It can be argued that in light of Brown, where the Court found
the non-statutory exemption could also protect some agreements not
embodied in the collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court
has rejected a requirement of arm's-length negotiation. 151 However,
the Court only included this caveat to protect agreements that took
place not during the collective bargaining process, but before the

148. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (quoting Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954,
959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
149. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).
150. See generally Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
151. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 243.
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making of the agreement or after the expiration of an agreement. 152
Where there is absolutely no evidence of an agreement during the
collective bargaining process - such as a rule that originated in 1925
and was included in a document which the union waived its right to
bargain over - the protection Brown offers is not applicable.
Furthermore, the Clarett approach, which mirrors Justice
Goldberg's opinion that all "collective bargaining activity concerning
mandatory subjects of bargaining under the [labor laws] [should not
be] subject to the antitrust laws," 153 is inconsistent with the Brown
decision, which laid out further requirements for the exemption to
apply. In fact, the entire basis of the Clarett (and Wood) line of cases that the exemption should be applied differently to professional sports
due to its "unusual economic imperatives" 154 - is also inconsistent with
Brown, which refused the players' contention that the labor of
professional sports players was unique and that the market for
players' services therefore should be treated differently. 155
But, the question remains: should the parties be forced to prove
particular quid pro quo to satisfy the bona fide arm's-length
bargaining requirement, as adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey
and rejected by the Second Circuit in Clarett? In this respect, neither
circuit has the correct approach.
Collective bargaining is indeed a process, and the resulting
collective bargaining agreement consists of "unique bundle[s] of
compromises" over a great deal of complex issues.1 56 As a result,
establishing proof of quid pro quo for a subject of bargaining can
sometimes be an unrealistic enterprise even when the subject was a
product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining. For this reason, it may
not be wise to demand proof of quid pro quo to defeat these types of
antitrust challenges.
However, while proof of quid pro quo may be an unrealistic
way to realize labor law's fundamental principles requiring good faith
bargaining, proof that the restraint was discussed at all during the
bargaining process is a different story. Aside from it being realistic for
the parties to present a minimum showing that the issue was simply
discussed, it is also a desirable way to keep the parties honest when
they maintain a provision that was indeed a product of bona fide,
152. See id.
153. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 710 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
154. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
155. See discussion supra Part I.C.
156. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143 (quoting Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954,
959 (2d Cir. 1987)).

174

VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 8:1:149

arms-length bargaining. While this minimum showing should consist
of more than a single, unsubstantiated declaration from a league
employee (as the NFL attempted to do in Clarett), it should likely be
satisfied by an accompanying declaration from a players' union
representative, or even something as insignificant as the minutes from
the meeting in which the matter was discussed.
This modified Mackey approach, requiring a minimum showing
in lieu of quid pro quo, is therefore the most practical and efficient
way to realize labor law's fundamental principles, and should be the
catalyst for another dramatic turn in the meandering precedent
dating back to Flood v. Kuhn.
III. CONCLUSION
The fate of Maurice Clarett became sealed when he brought his
lawsuit within the Second Circuit, but the fate of the NFL eligibility
rule may still be in doubt. With a trio of circuits on record as having
adopted the Mackey test when deciding on the application of the nonstatutory exemption, it is quite possible that such a court would find
the eligibility rule to violate antitrust laws. These courts would place
the burden on the NFL to prove that the rule was a product of bona
fide arms-length negotiation, and since the NFL likely does not have
sufficient evidence to satisfy this burden, the third requirement in the
Mackey test would not be satisfied and the exemption would not apply.
With a successful challenge by someone like Adrian Peterson,
the circuit split would become crystallized, and the Supreme Court
would likely be forced to grant certiorari once and for all. And even
though many legal analysts feel the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown "sacrificed antitrust goals to a degree unnecessary to the
service of labor law goals," 157 it is also apparent that the Brown
decision "failed to provide a proper clarification of how antitrust law
should accommodate federal labor law. 1 58
A comparison of each approach to the circuit split reveals that
the only material difference between the two is that the Mackey
requirement that the restraint be a product of bona fide arms-length
bargaining, which actually furthers the fundamental principles of
federal labor policies - those of "free," "private," and "good faith"
bargaining. However, since establishing proof of quid pro quo for a
subject of bargaining can sometimes be impossibly burdensome, the
Court would likely find that it was entirely possible that the NFL

157.
158.

Harper, supra note 3, at 1666-67.
Id. at 1666.
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players' association "might not have regarded any difference of
opinion with respect to the eligibility rules as sufficient to warrant the
expenditure of precious time at the bargaining table in light of other
159
important issues."
But, if the Court were to adopt the modified Mackey approach,
which requires a minimum showing that the provision in question was
simply discussed during the collective bargaining process, it is likely
the NFL would not be able to produce sufficient evidence that the test
requires. As a result, the eligibility rule would not fall within the nonstatutory exemption, and the floodgates for underclassmen would be
forced open for any youngster daring enough to run through.
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